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IN TH,E SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY C. GREGUHN, 
Plain ti/ /-Respondent, 
-vs.-
MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY and UNITED 
BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-A wellants 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No. 11544 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to collect benefits for total and 
permanent disability from two health and accident 
insurance policies, which the Plaintiff-Respondent 
had with the Defendants-Appellants Companies. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for Plaintiff-Respondent, Defendant.s-
Appellants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of judg-
ment and for judgment in their favor as a matter of 
law; or, that failing, a new trial; or, that failing, re-
\'ersal of that portion of the judgment awarding fu-
ture benefits to Plaintiff-Respondent. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 12, 1962, Plaintiff-Respondent, Harry 
C. Greguhn, was insured under a Health and Acci-
dent policy, with the Defendant-Appellant, United 
Benefit Life Insurance Company, and on May 8, 
1964, was insured under a policy with Defendant-
Appellant, Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. 
Both policies basically involved health and accident 
coverage. In both policies, and in his discharge from 
the service, Plaintiff-Respondent gave his occupation 
as being a brick contractor, and told the court ( R. 
68) (T. 21) that he had built homes as a brick con-
tractor "in the thousands." 
Plaintiff-Respondent had had some serious 
health problems prior to obtaining the policies with 
the Defendants-Appellants companies. He was medi-
cally discharged from the service from Letterman 
General Hospital in San Francisco, California, on 
June 20, 1941, afer having been in the service for 
only two months. Plaintiff-Respondent stated that 
the reason for his discharge ( R. 78) ( T. 31 ) was "I 
was a little too high strung." However he t.old Dr. 
Tedrow (R. 151) ( T. 111) that the Army considered 
him suicidal,, although he disagreed with this diag-
nosis. Plainfff-Respondent had also lost his right eye 
in an industrial accident in 1943. 
About a week prior to September 21, 1964, Plain-
tiff-Respondent was working on a scaffold as a brick 
mason when a plank on the scaffold fell out from 
underneath him and he fell against the wall with his 
2 
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belly and he ended up sitting on the other plank. (R. 
;)5) (T.8). 
On September 21, 1964, while working on the 
same job, while employed by "\\r estern States Mason-
ry, again on a scaffold, he experienced a plank fall 
out from underneath him, caught himself with one 
hand on the wall and the other hand on the scaffold. 
( R. 56) ( T. 9). His employer lifted him up and put 
him on the other plank and told him to sit there for a 
while. About an hour or an hour and a half later, 
his back began to bother him and he left work at 4 :00 
o'clock (R. 57) (T. 10). 
The following day the Plaintiff-Respondent saw 
Dr. Robert Lamb, orthopedic surgeon, who, on exam-
ination, found that the Plaintiff-Respondent was 
overweight with considerable increased lumbar lor-
dosis or swayback (R. 86) (T. 39). Plaintiff-
Respondent weighed approximately 218 pounds. Dr. 
Lamb took X-Rays which showed the Plaintiff-Re-
spondent's back to have what Dr. Lamb called a pars 
interarticularis defect at the L-5, S-1 level. Dr. Lamb 
stated that this was in orthopedics language a spon-
dy lolisthesis and "it's a defect between the articula-
tions of the vertebral parts where they articulate 
with the one above and the one below." This defect, 
according to Dr. Lamb, might be either congenital or 
acquired ( R. 87) ( T. 40). Dr. Lamb also found the 
Plaintiff-Respondent to have degenerative disc dis-
ease in the remaining part of the lumbar spine, as 
3 
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well as arthritic changes. Dr. Lamb noted that Plain-
tiff-Respondent has considerable degenerative disc 
disease and disc changes even in his neck. ( R. 97) 
(T. 50).Dr. Lamb testified that there was no ques-
tion, based upon the X-Rays taken on September 22, 
1964, but that the spondylolisthesis existed prior to 
the accident (R. 101) (T. 54), and that there was 
also no question that the degenerative disc disease 
existed prior to Plaintiff-Respondent's accident on 
September 21, 1964. 
Further, based upon the examination of Sep-
tember 22, 1964, Dr. Lamb felt that the Plaintiff-
Respondent, in addition to having the spondylolis-
thesis and degenerative disc disease, had received 
some injury causing pressure on the nerve roots at 
the lower lumbar level. ( R. 92) ( T. 45) . \\7th a spon-
dy lolisthesis Dr. Lamb stated that there was a ten-
dency of the vertebral bodies to slip back and forward 
without any bony connection holding it, and if it 
slides far enough it gets some stretch on the nerve 
roots. (R. 88) (T. 41). Dr. Lamb further testified 
on ( R. 93) ( T. 46) , "now as to whether he had any 
more slippage after than before, one really can't say." 
It was mostly an irritation. Dr. Lamb recommended 
conservative treatment involving physical therapy 
and the Plaintiff-Respondent continued to complain 
of pain. 
In October, 1964, Plaintiff-Respondent was hos-
pitalized and on October 23, 1964, Dr. Lamb per-
formed surgery on his back and fused the interverte-
4 
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bral area between L-4 and S-1 of the sacrum. Plain-
tiff-Respondent continued to complain of back prob-
lems and on February 11, 1966, Dr. Lamb performed 
a further surgery upon the Plaintiff-Respondent's 
back, "which consisted of fusing the small amount 
of motion between L-4 and 5, and also fusing the joint 
between the third and fourth lumbar vertebra" (R. 
96)(T.49). 
The hospital record, Exhibit B-10 of the St. 
Marks Hospital, indicates that the final diagnosis 
after surgery in October, 1964 was: -1. Degenerative 
disc disease lumbar and 2. Spondylolisthesis. 
Plaintiff-Respondent was also hospitalized on 
January 10, 1966, and the initial clinical impression 
was: 1. Chronic or peptic gastritis and/or ulcer. 2. 
Chronic back disease, not currently a problem. The 
final diagnosis was peptic gastritis. (Exhibit P-7). 
Dr. Lamb stated that several times he had ad-
vised the Plaintiff-Respondent to lose weight. (R. 
102) ( T. 55). And to improve his abdominal strength. 
Because of Plaintiff-Respondent's being overweight 
and because he didn't improve his abdominal strength, 
his back condition was aggravated and therefore he 
couldn't participate in employment which would re-
quire stooping, bending or sitting or standing in any 
position for a long time. ( R. 103) ( T. 56) . 
Dr. Lamb stated that Plaintiff-Respondent had 
received traction type injury, (R. 106) (T. 59), and 
that his present symptoms, at the time of trial were 
5 
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caused by the degenerative changes in the remaining 
part of his lumbar spine, together with the problem 
of keeping his weight down. Dr. Lamb stated excess-
ive weight is hard on the back and adds a little more 
pain. ( R. 97) ( T. 50). Dr. Lamb further stated 
that in the area of the spondylolisthesis which was 
fused, the Plaintiff-Respondent is better than before 
(R. 107) (T. 60) and that many of the Plantiff-
Respondent's problems were subjective and not clinic-
ally diagnosed. (R. 108). (T. 61). Dr. Lamb stated 
that the pre-existing, degenerative disc disease and 
spondylolisthesis, cooperating with the accident, 
caused the pain and suffering for which the Plaintiff-
Respondent sought Dr. Lamb's help, and the pre-
existing conditions made him more vulnerable to 
injury than "had he not had them." ( R. 108) ( T. 
61 ). 
Dr. Lamb further testified that the spondylolis-
thesis and degenerative disc disease was an indepen-
dent agency already existing in the back at the time 
he had the accident (R. 108)(T. 61), and that the ac-
cident didn't cause the spondylolisthesis or degenera-
tive disc disease ( R. 109) ( T. 62). In answer to the 
question: "But that because of these pre-existing con-
ditions, the injured back was a favorable spot, coop-
erating in '[Xlrallel with the accident to cause him the 
problenis which he has had since the accident?" 
Dr. Lamb answered: "Yes." (R. 109) (T. 62). He 
further testfied that if this accident hadn't triggered 
the problem, then probably some other occurrence 
6 
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could have produced the same result. Otherwise, 
Plaintiff-Respondent is in good health. (R. 110) (T. 
63). 
In giving his opinion as to whether or not the 
accident that he described on September 21, 1964, 
probably caused the disability, that he indicated, Dr. 
Lamb would only say, ( R. 99) ( T. 52), "Well, ac-
cording to this man's history, he had worked up until 
that time, and I never felt that he should be released 
to go back to that type of work. I don't think he will be 
able to return to that type of work." Mr. Greguhn 
had told Dr. Lamb that he was a brick mason. 
In stating his opinion as to the cause of Plaintiff. 
Respondent's disability, Dr. Lamb stated, "I think 
that his disability is related to that accident." (R. 99) 
(T. 52). Dr. Lamb further stated the previous exist-
ing spondylolisthesis and lumbar disc disease and the 
arthritic changes in Plaintiff-Respondent's back have 
a substantial importance in contributing toward his 
disability. (R. 107) (T. 60). Dr. Lamb also stated 
that the Plaintiff-Respondent could do sedentary 
work. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent denied being hospital-
ized for chronic or peptic gastritis and/or ulcer (R. 
112) ( T. 65) , and also denied ever having been hos-
pitalized prior to September 21, 1964. The Plaintiff. 
Respondent admitted that there were some brick con-
tractors who didn't actualy work on the wall ( R. 
119) ( T. 72) and that he could use a telephone, could 
7 
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write, that he could walk up to about 50 feet without 
using a cane, that he was not confined to house, and 
in answer to the question if there were anything 
about his condition which would prevent him from 
figuring jobs, he said "Well, there are no jobs." ( R. 
71) (T. 24). He stated that he enjoyed driving and 
that it relaxed him. 
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Orthopedic Surgeon, ex-
amined the Plaintiff-Respondent on August 20, 1965. 
He found the Plaintiff-Respondent to have medically 
bizarre symptoms in that the absence of atrophy or 
signs of nerve damage didn't fit into the pattern of 
nervousness, shaking, stumbling, and the type of loss 
of control over his legs. (R 142) (T95). His exami-
nation indicated there was displacement of one centi-
meter of the lumbar bones with the upper part of the 
sacrum (R 143) (T 96). He examined the X-Rays 
taken on September 22, 1964 and it was Dr. Hol-
brook's opinion that the spondylolfthesis and lumbar 
disc disease existed prior to the accident. ( R 155) 
(T 108). 
It was Dr. Holbrook's opinion (R 144) (T 97) 
that the Plaintiff-Respondent had a 20% permanent 
loss of bodily function as a result of t1;t.zondy1ilis-
thesis and lumbar disc problem and Ji accident, 
and found his general health to be good (R 145) (T 
98). Dr. Holbrook further testified that the Plain-
tiff-Respondent exhibited about 75% of what would 
be normal motion for a man of his age and body build 
( R 146) ( T 99). He further testified that the lack 
8 
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of motion in the lumbar area, based upon his tests 
was a voluntary restriction (R 146) (T 99). Dr. 
Holbrook testified that in his opinion the Plaintiff-
Respondent was not totally disabled for gainful em-
ployment. He testified that the Plaintiff-Respondent 
was permanently disabled as a brick mason, work-
ing upon the line, handling the bricks and the mortar, 
but that he was generally familiar with the physical 
requirements of a building contractor engaged in 
brick contracting where they were not required to 
actually do the masonry work themselves, and that if 
the Plaintiff-Respondent limited his physical work to 
estimating and supervision, he was not totally and 
permanently disabled from doing this kind of work. 
(R 150) (T 103). 
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, Psychiatrist, also examined 
the Plaintiff-Respondent on October 18, 1967. He 
took a medical history from the Plaintiff-Respondent 
and enquired as to the Plaintiff-Respondent's weight, 
"because I felt that he was considerably overweight 
for someone who complained of a bad back. He said 
he weighed about 210 pounds. Dr. Lamb had asked 
him to diet. Then he said 'Why should I diet? They 
would then say I have some kind of sickness. They 
are trying to pull everything under the sun.'* * * He 
also told me that he felt that his doctor had been in-
fluenced against him by the insurance company, and 
further that- * * * had fired two attorneys so far, 
and kept on then with this hostile attitude in his dis-
cussion, finally saying that if he didn't get what he 
9 
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\ 1.rantcd frolll the Industrial Commission, he intended 
to sue the Western States Masonry Company." (R 
158) (T 111). Dr. Tedrow stated, (R 159) (T 112), 
that the Plantiff-Respondent had no psychiatric 
prnblems which would keep him from engaging in 
his work as a bricklayer and brick contractor. 
Dr. \Vallace E. Hess, 01thopedic Surgeon, ex-
amined the Plainiff-Respondent on September 26, 
1967. Dr. Hess found the alignment of his spine to 
be good, except for mild degree of lordosis, that is 
sway back, which he attributed to obesity. Plaintiff-
Respondent could bend forward and reach to within 
two feet of the floor with his fingertips. He did not 
complain when doing this. He was able to squat down 
onto his heels and back six times without difficulty. 
(R 167) (T 120). The general examination was es-
sentially normal. He moved about the office without 
apparent difficulty. His nose was crooked from a 
fracture as a child. ( R 168) ( T 121). 
The X-Rays indicated a grade one spondylolis-
thesis and Dr. Hess found that the Plaintiff-Respon-
dent in terms of loss of bodily function had a 20% 
permanent partial impairment. ( R 169) (n22) It 
was Dr. Hess's opinion that the spondylolisthesis ex-
isted prior to the accident which occurred on Septem-
ber 21 1964. It was also his opinion that the lumbar 
disc disease existed prior td,.abcident on September 
21,1964. (Rl60) (Tl23) 
\Vhen Dr. Hess was asked what percentage of 
disability he would assess to the pre-existing condi-
10 
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tion as opposed to the condition brought on or ag-
gravated by the accident he stated "My opinion is 
that perhaps 80 to 90% of the 20% would be pre-
existent". (R 171) (T 124) 
He further testified ( R 172) ( T 125) the spon-
dy lolisthesis and degenerative disc disease made the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's back more susceptible to the 
lllJUl'y. 
Mr. William A. Morton Insurance Company in-
vestigator who performed a surveillance on the Plain-
tiff-Respondent testified as to the Plaintiff-Respon-
dent's varied activities over a period of time and 
stated that the Plaintiff-Respondent had no difficulty 
driving on the freeway and in maneuvering the Chry-
sler Impe1·ial which he was driving while it was being 
pushed by a Ford Fairlane in a circle to get it started. 
(R 176) (T 129) 
Mr. John R. Richards local manager of the De-
fendants-Appellants Companies testified that all 
benefits as called for by both insurance contracts 
were paid under the accident and sickness provisions 
except for total and permanent disability from acci-
dent alone. The pertinent provision in the Mutual of 
Omaha Policy is : 
r 
"Total Loss of Time' * * * also means 
that period of time during which you are un-
able to engage in any other gainful work or 
service for which you are reasonably fitted 
by education, training or experience." 
11 
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And under Part "A": 
" 'Injuries' means accidental bodily in-
juries received \vhile this policy is in force 
and resulting in a loss independently of sick-
ness and other causes." 
And in the case of the United Benefit policy, under 
Part "A": 
"The term 'Loss of Time' * * * means 
that period of time for which the insured is 
unable to perfonn none of his occupational 
duties." * * * 
And in the insuring clause, the policy holder is in-
sured 
"against loss of life, limb, or sight result-
ing directly and independently of all other 
causes from accidental bodily injuries received 
while this policy is in force." * ;, * 
Mr. Richards testified that the Defendants-Ap-
pellants had paid a total of $2,346.66 in benefits and 
that he, personally, explained the rehabilitation pro-
visions of the Mutual of Omaha Policy. Mr. Greguhn, 
the Plaintiff-Respondent, indicated to Mr. Richards 
that he did not wish to discuss rehabilitation in view 
of the fact that the Industrial Commission of the 
State of Utah had not yet concluded their findings 
on his loss. (R 185) (T 138). 
The jury found the issues in favor of the Plain-
tiff-Respondent and against the Defendants-Appel-
lants on a general verdict, and the jury was dis-
missed. The Court, having previously ruled that De-
fendants-Appellants had repudiated or renounced 
12 
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the Con tract ( R 50) ( T 3), then determined the 
amount of future damages based upon Exhibit 15 
by multiplying the life expectancy of a male person 
of Plaintiff-Respondent's age times the yearly bene-
fits under the contracts, discounted to present value. 
O\'er the Defendants-Appellants' objection, the Court 
ente1·ed judgment in the sum of $49,225. 78, repre-
senting $15,018.00 for past amounts due, up to the 
time of trial and $34,207.03 for future payments. 
(R 195) (T 148), (R 196) (T 149) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO 
THE JURY. 
In order for the Plaintiff-Respondent to re-
cover, under the language of the policy, it was nec-
essary that: First, he be totally disabled; and sec-
ondly, that the disability result from the accident 
alone, exclusive of all other causes. There was not 
sufficient evidence on either of these propositions to 
submit the case to the jury. 
The applications for both policies of insurance in-
dicated that the Plaintiff-Respondent was a brick 
contractor. The Application for insurance became 
part of the contract and therefore, the Defendants-
Appellants insured the Plaintiff-Respondent as a 
brick contractor in the usual sense of this profession. 
Therefore, in order for Plaintiff-Respondent to be 
13 
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entitled to payment under the Mutual of Omaha pol-
icy it is necessary that the Plaintiff-Respondent be 
unable to engage in any other gainful work or serv-
ice for which Plaintiff-Respondent was reasonably 
fitted by education, training or experience as a brick 
contractor, and under the United Benefit Policy it 
means that the Plaintiff-Respondent is able to per-
form none of his occupational duties as a brick con-
tractor. The Army discharge of the Plaintiff in June 
1941, (Exhibit D-8), also indicates that he was, by oc-
cupation, a brick contractor. The Plaintiff-Respond-
ent indicated that he knew of brick contractors who 
did not work on the wall (R 119 (T 72) and when 
asked if there was anything about his condition 
which would prevent him from figuring jobs, his 
answer was, "Well there are no jobs." (R 71) 
( T 24). In addition, there was no medical evidence 
to the effect that Plaintiff-Respondent could not 
work as a brick contractor, providing he limited his 
activities to sedentary work. In fact, Dr. Holbrook 
testified that if he limited his work to estimating 
and supervising, he was not permanently and totally 
disabled, and both Dr. Holbrook and Dr. Hess, as of 
the time of their examinations, found that he only 
had a 20% permanent loss of bodily function as a re-
sult of the spondylol~thesis lumbar disc problem and 
the accident. ( R 144) ( T 97). 
The Plaintiff-Respondent told Dr. Hess ( R. 166) 
(T. 119) that he could sit in his car and drive all day 
and this was the only enjoyment he gets. 
14 
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Dr. Tedrow testified that there was no reason, 
from a psychiaritic standpoint why the Plaintiff-
Respondent could not continue engaging in his work 
as a bricklayer and a brick contractor (R. 159) (T. 
112). 
The inference from the testimony is that the 
Plaintiff-Respondent did not wish to work. In fact 
he had not worked from the date of the fall. He had 
pursued benefits under the policies with the Defend-
ants-Appellants companies. He had pursued benefits 
under Social Security and Workman's Compensation. 
When the rehabilitation provisions of the contract 
were discussed with him, by Mr. Richards, he indi-
cated that he did not wish to pursue the rehabilitation 
because the Industrial Commission of the State of 
Utah had not made their findings in his case, ( R. 
185) ( T. 138), presumably because he felt his case 
would be prejudiced if he went back to work. 
His medical discharge, his bizarre symptoms, as 
testified to by Dr. Holbrook, indicating an absence 
of atrophy or sign of nerve damage ( R. 142) ( T. 95) 
together with his statements of suspicion that his 
physician, Dr. Lamb, had been influenced against 
him by the insurance companies, and his refusal to 
diet or strengthen his belly muscles, indicated that he 
did not wish to cooperate in going back to work. In-
deed, his statement to Dr. Tedrow (R. 158) (T. 111) 
"Why should I diet? They would then say I have 
some kind of sickness. They are trying to pull every-
15 
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thing under the sun," indicates his lack of desire to 
cooperate and is indicative of his attitude. This was 
born out by his own doctor, Dr. Lamb, who stated 
that (R. 108 (T. 61) many of the Plaintiff-Respond-
ent's problems are subjective and not clinically diag-
nosed. 
The review of the extent of his activities by Mr. 
William A. Morton who had him under surveillance, 
indicated that Plaintiff-Respondent carried on a sub-
stantially normal range of activities and he appeared 
to be able to do substantially all that he wished to do. 
(R.174) (T.127), (R.175) (T.128), (R.176) 
(T. 129), (R.177) (T. 130), (R. 178) (T. 131). 
Plaintiff-Respondent's own physician, Dr. Lamb, 
testified that the spondylolisthesis and degenerative 
disc disease was an independent agency already exist-
ing in the back at the time of the accident. (R. 108) 
(T. 61). He further testified (R. 109)(T. 62) that 
because of the pre-existing condition, the injured back 
was a favorable spot, cooperating in parallel with the 
accident to cause him the problems which he has had 
since the accident, and that if this accident hadn't 
triggered the problem, very probably some other oc-
currence could have produced the same result ( R. 
110) ( T. 63 ) . 
Dr. Hess testified that in terms of percent, that 
it was his opinion, (R. 171) (T. 124), that 80 to 90% 
of the 20% of Mr. Greguhn's loss of bodily function 
would be pre-existent. Both of these conditions were 
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neither inactive, quiescent, nor dormant. They were 
progressive and getting worse. Dr. Hess found the 
spondylolisthesis to be grade 1. (R. 169) (T.122). 
Dr. Holbrook testified that as of the date of his 
examination, the Plaintiff-Respondent exhibited 
about 75% of what he would consider normal motion 
for a man of the Plaintiff-Respondent's age and body 
build. ( R. 146) ( T. 99) . 
Plaintiff.Respondent's own physician testified 
that the spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc dis-
ease was an independent agency already existing in 
the back at the time of the accident and caused the 
problems for which the Plaintiff-Respondent sought 
Dr. Lamb's treatment. (R. 108)(T. 61). 
Dr. Lamb also stated: "Question: But that be-
cause of these pre-existing conditions, the injured 
back was a favorable spot, cooperating in parallel 
with the accident to cause him the problems which 
he has had since the accident?" Answer: "Yes." 
(R. 109) (T. 62). 
The Plaintiff-Respondent denied that he had 
been previously bothered by his back condition. This 
statement should be considered in light of other state-
ments he made. For example: He said that he never 
consulted any doctors for any condition or diseases 
and that he enjoyed wonderful health and he had no 
problems of any kind he knew about (R. 54) (T. 7). 
He forgot to tell about having a broken nose as a 
child, being in Letterman General Hospital and being 
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discha1·ged from the hospital and from the United 
States Army after only two months in the service, 
and denied being hospitalized for chronic or peptic 
gastritis and/ or ulcer ( R. 112) ( T. 65), though the 
hospital records were admitted into evidence (Ex-
hibit P. 7). 
The final diagnosis sheet, in connection with the 
surgery, performed the following month after the 
accident, clearly states what Plaintiff-Respondent's 
health problem was: 
1. Degenerative disc disease lumbar 
2. Spondylolisthesis 
and makes no reference in the diagnosis to the acci-
dent. 
The degree to which a previous condition is symp-
tomatic prior to an accidental injury does not deter-
mine from a legal sense or medical sense whether it 
was in fact present. To say that if the previous exist-
ing conditions were not bothersome, they were not 
legally there, no matter how fatal or debilitating 
medically, is grossly unfair to the insurer. For ex-
ample: An insured's body may be full of unknown 
and asymptomatic cancerous growths of terminal 
consequences, and death may follow soon after a 
slight injury, but the immutable fact is that the 
cause in fact of the death was the cancer, or the can-
cer and the injury, and not the injury, exclusive of all 
other causes. 
A summary of the Plaintiff-Respondent's health 
problems include the broken nose as a child, psycho-
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logical problems, spondylolisthesis, degenerative disc 
disease, arthritic changes and gastritis and/or ulcers 
and the loss of one eye. Unfortunate as they are, the 
long train of consequences of all of these health prob-
lems should not end up legally as a result of a fall of 
a short distance involving traction type injury when 
he caught himself by his arms. To permit the jury 
under the Court's instructions to find that this injury 
is the legal cause of his present condition, and that 
this condition is in effect totally and permanently 
disabling from gainful employment as a brick con-
tractor, is error. 
The Court, in overruling Defendants-Appellants' 
Motion for a Directed Verdict, at the end of the evi-
dence, stated, (R. 188) (T. 141) that he was con-
sidering this case to be bound by the rule of Lee vs. 
New York Life Insurance Company, 95 U. 445, 82 
P.2d 178, rather than the language of Browning vs. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States, 94 U. 532, 72 P.2nd 1060. The Court, in the 
Lee case, at page 179, states the rule as follows: 
"Where an accidental injury sets in mo-
tion or starts activity of a latent or dormant 
disease and such disease contributes to the 
death after having been so precipitated by the 
accident, the disease is not a direct or indirect 
cause of the death, nor a contributing cause 
within the meaning of the terms of the policy, 
but the accident which started the mischief, 
and precipitated the condition resulting in 
death is the sole cause of death." 
The significant language is, "sets in motion, or 
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starts." It is Defendants-Appellants' contention in 
the instant case that Plaintiff-Respondent's fall 
neither started nor set in motion the spondylolisthe-
sis or degenerative disc disease. 
Justice Wolfe in his dissent in the Browning case, 
distinguishes the Lee case from the Browning case, 
by stating that in the Browning case, the infection 
or toxhnia was operating in parallel, rather than in 
series, as in the Lee case. As Justice Wolfe notes, if 
this is not a valid diff errence, the only case which 
apparently would not be covered by the policy would 
be where the course of the chain leading from the in-
jury and the course of the chain leading from the 
other cause, be it disease, toxemia, or what not, were 
shown to be entirely separated, without any inter-
action, one with the other. If this is so, the language 
in the policy "independent of all other causes" has 
been judicially read completely out of the policy. 
Assuming, without admitting that as Mr. Greg-
uhn stated, the back condition was asymptomatic 
prior to the injury, this cannot be controlling. 
The actual efficient cause was that the lumbar disc 
disease and spondylolisthesis were two causes which 
were grinding away, doing their mischief, had been 
doing so for many years prior to the accident, and 
continued to do so afterwards. Dr. Lamb noted the 
disc changes even in Mr. Greguhn's neck. ( R. 97) 
(T. 50). The grinding was inexorable. It was irre-
versible. It was continuous. It was in parallel. ( R. 
108) (T 61). 
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The stage was set. The actors were already 
present. At most, all the accident did was raise the 
curtain. 
The spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc dis-
ease were not produced, nor set in motion by the in-
jury. 
Notice how similarly the language of Dr. Lamb 
(R. 108) (T. 61) was to the language of Justice 
vVolfe concurring in Lee vs. New York Life, supra, 
explaining that the difference is whether the pre-
existing condition and accident are hooked together 
in parallel or in series: 
"The causes are linked together in series, 
-the accident causing the injury, the injury 
causing the diffusion of an infection, and the 
infection causing the appendicites and the ap-
pendicites causing death. This is not the 
Browning Case, where the course of the injury 
was one thing which simply set the stage, 
whilst the toxemia, an independent, crusading 
agency, already there, not produced nor set in 
motion by the injury, but simply using the in-
jured part as a favorable spot for its operation, 
therefore operating not in series but in parall-
el, was the efficient, paramount and independ-
ent cause of the prolonged inability." 
The principles of law enunciated in the previous 
Utah cases are followed in the most recent case, 
Thompsen vs. American Casualty Co., 439 P.2nd276, 
20 U.2nd 418. The primary issue in this case again 
was whether or not the Plaintiff-Respondent's disa-
bility was a result of accidental means, as provided 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
under the terms of the instll'ance contract. The trial 
court in granting the summary judgment held that 
it was not. The Supreme Court remanded the matter 
for trial stating that a question of fact had been 
raised which foreclosed granting of summary judg-
ment. The Court also said: 
"A second issue, to be determined by the 
trier of the facts, is whether Plaintiff's physi-
cal disability resulted from accidental means 
directly and independently of all other causes. 
As previously observed, Plaintiff had certain 
infirmaties and disabilities prior to his sus-
taining his state of alleged complete physical 
disability. It is Defendant's contention that 
even if Plaintiff's disability were the result 
of accidental means, he was suffering from 
prior disabilities which cooperated with the 
alleged accident; and, therefore, the accident 
cannot be considered the sole cause or a cause 
independent of all other causes of his disabil-
ity." Citing White vs. National Postal Trans-
port Association, 1 U.2nd 5, 261 P.2nd 924; 
Lee vs. New York Life Insuram,ce Co., 95 U. 
445, 82 P.2nd 178; Tucker vs. New York Life 
Insurance Co., 107 U. 478, 155 P.2nd 173." 
The case at bar is more similar to Tucker vs. 
New York Life, 155 P. 2nd 173, 107 U. 478. In this 
case the diseased condition had so weakened the aorta 
of the Plaintiff, decedent, that it could not stand the 
increased blood pressure occasioned by the insured's 
fall and the resulting dissection of the aorta, causing 
the insured's death. It was held that the insured's 
death did not result from bodily injury effected solely 
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through external, violent and independent cause with-
in the double indemnity provision of a life policy. 
The Court, in the Tucker case, supra, reiterated 
the distinctions as follows, at page 175: 
"The courts, in interpreting the clause 
in insurance policies like that here involved, 
to-wit: An injury effected through violent, 
external, and accidental means, entirely inde-
pendent of all other causes, have made three 
distinctions or classes of cases: ( 1) When 
an accident causes a diseased condition which, 
together with the accident, results in the in-
jury or death complained of, the accident alone 
is to be considered as the cause of the injury 
or death." Ci ting cases. " ( 2) When at the time 
of the accident, the insured was suffering from 
some disease, but the disease had no causal 
connection with the injury or death resulting 
from the accident, the accident is to be consid-
ered the sole cause." 
The appellants in this case contend that it falls 
within the third category: 
" ( 3) When at the time of the accident, 
there was an existing disease which, cooyerat-
ing with the accident, resulted in the mjury 
or death, the accident cannot be considered as 
the sole cause, or as the cause independent of 
all other causes." Citing cases. 
The Defendants-Appellants contend that under 
the facts of this case, no reasonable minds could differ 
on the point that there was existing diseases which 
cooperated with the accident and therefore cannot be 
considered as the sole cause or as a cause independent 
of all other causes. 
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POINT NO. II 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT 
DID NOT CORRECTLY STATE THE 
LAW. 
The Court did not adequately instruct upon the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's theory of the case. 
The Instructions of the Court, in effect, re-wrote 
the contract. 
The Instructions of the Court emphasized what 
Plaintiff-Respondent had done in terms of employ-
ment, more than what he can do. 
The Court failed to instruct that it would be 
necessary to find both that the Plaintiff-Respondent 
was totally and permanently disabled and from the 
accident alone, independent of other causes, as set 
forth in Requested Instruction No. 1. 
The Court failed to properly instruct upon De-
fendant-Appellants' theory of the case as set forth in 
the Defendants-Appellants' Requested Instructions. 
The Court refused to give the Defendants-
Appellants' proposed Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
and 8. 
The Instructions did not cover all of the issues. 
In Requested Instruction No. 3, Defendants-
Appellants requested the Court to instruct that in 
accordance with the provisions of the terms of both 
policies, that benefits are not payable for mental dis-
ease or disorder. There was evidence in the record 
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that Plaintiff-Respondent was discharged from the 
Army because of mental disorders, and Dr. Lamb 
testified that many of his problems were subjective 
( R. 108) ( T. 61 ) and Dr. Holbrook testified that the 
absence of atrophy or sign of nerve damage was medi-
cally a bizarre symptom. ( R. 142) ( T. 95). 
The jury, from this evidence could, under proper 
instructions, make an inference that Mr. Greguhn 
was totally disabled because of attitude, rather than 
physical condition. Since mental disease or disorders 
are not covered under either policy, Mr. Greguhn's 
disability for this reason would be excluded from 
coverage. To be entitled to benefits under the policy, 
Mr. Greguhn would have to be totally disabled from 
accident, not from a combination of accident and/or 
mental disorder and/or spondylolisthesis and/or de-
generative disease and/or arthritic changes. Defend-
ants-Appellants were entitled to have the jury in-
structed upon the issue of mental disease or disorder 
and failure to do so was prejudicial. 
The Court's Instruction No. 12 was an attempt 
to define "latent" or "dormant." The Court said: 
"Latent and dormant, as used in these 
instructions, mean powers or qualities that 
have not yet come into sight or into action, 
but may, and suggest inactivity." 
The jury could not properly, under this Instruction, 
from the evidence, find that Mr. Greguhn's condition 
of spondylolisthesis and lumbar disc disease were 
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latent and dormant. The X-Rays taken on September 
22, 1964 showed that the pre-existing conditions had 
come into sight and were active and were not dor-
mant. Dr. Lamb, Dr. Holbrook and Dr. Hess who saw 
the X-Rays all concurred. 
Instructions Nos. 14, 15 and 17 are defective and 
prejudicial. Instruction No. 14 states: 
"Total and permanent disability in this 
case means that the Plaintiff has a condition 
which disallows him from f ollowng his occupa-
tion and from doing substantially all the acts 
that are necessarily and usually performed by 
one who follows that occupation." 
This Instruction is defective because it is objective 
in nature. Instructions 15 and 17 apply the same 
standard and are defective for the same reason. They 
attempt to instruct on what others do, rather than 
placing the emphasis upon that which Mr. Greguhn 
can do. They are further defective because they de-
part from the language of the policies. The language 
of the Mutual of Omaha policy is subjective in nature 
and states under "Total Loss of Time": 
"It also means that period of time during 
which you are unable to engage in any other 
gainful work or service for which ymt are 
reasonably fitted by education, training or 
experience." 
The same defect applies to Instructions 14, 15 and 
17. The Rule, as stated in Instructions 14, 15 and 17 
is contrary to public policy, because it encourages in-
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sureds to not try to become gainfully employed. This 
is the reason Mr. Greguhn refused rehabiltation 
for feai· it would prejudice his Industrial Claim. It 
places a premium on disability rather than on ability. 
The test should be as stated in the Contract, "gainful 
work or service for which you are reasonably fitted 
by education, trainng or experience." 
In defining the language in the Mutual of Omaha 
Policy and Instructions 16 and 1 7, the Com't expands 
and redefines the language in the Contract, and in 
effect makes a new contract for the Parties. For the 
courts to continue to make new contracts for the in-
surance company, works a hardship on those seeking 
insurance. In order to compensate for the expanded 
meaning of the policies, premiums must be computed 
with the increased liability in mind, and, as Justice 
\Volfe points out in Browning vs. Equitable Li/ e As-
surance Society, supra, at page 1071: 
"and makes it more difficult for persons 
of ordinary means who need to be protected 
against the hazards of accidents, rather than 
sickness, from obtaining such protection. 
Moreover, it makes it more difficult or im-
possible for known sick people to obtain acci-
dent policies." 
Further, Justice Wolfe noted, at page 1072: 
"In this case the existing toxemia attack-
ed an impaired part. It existed independently 
of the injury. The causes are hooked up in 
parallel and not in series. The insurer con-
tracted to pay for disabilities solely caused by 
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an accident and not a disability caused by the 
localization of toxemia in the body not caused 
by the accident but which beset the part be-
cause the accident has presented the opportun-
ity." 
The result reached in this case is that the insurer is 
required to pay an indemnity for the possession of a 
spondylolisthesis and a diseased disc condition, rather 
than an indemnity for disability totally accident 
caused. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
AN AWARD FOR FUTURE DISABIL-
ITY UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF AN-
TICIPATORY BREACH. 
In the pleadings, and all through the trial and 
now, both Defendants-Appellants admitted the valid-
ity and binding effect of both policies of insurance. 
Both of the policies in the instant case, required 
the submitting of continuing proofs of loss. To hold 
that an anticipatory breach of an insurance contract, 
with an absolute and unequivocal renunciation of 
liability under it, permits an action upon the entire 
contract as a matter of anticipatory breach and makes 
a new contract for the Parties. In the case of Erreca 
v 5, '[JS-. Western States Life Insurance ComTJ<lny, Cal., 
121P.2nd689, the Court stated: 
"In a literal sense no one knows whether 
disability is permanent until the death of the 
insured, and a disability which at the outset 
appears to be of lasting and indefinite dura-
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tion may be in fact otherwise. Accordingly, 
in many cases it was held that the insured's 
probable physical recovery from a totally dis-
abling illness defeated his claim for total and 
permanent disability benefits." 
In the case of Colovos vs. Home Life Insurance 
Co. of New York, 83 U. 401, 28 P.2nd 607, the Court 
stated the rule correctly: 
"As a general rule of law, where an insur-
ance contract is involved, you cannot include 
in the judgments sums not yet payable under 
the contract, and the court should have in-
structed the jury that recovery is limited up 
to the time of the filling of the amended com-
plaint." 
The Colovos case, supra, is quoted in the annota-
tion which appears at 99 ALR 171, with those cases 
holding to the view that the right of action is limited 
to accrued installments, together with the view that 
action lies upon the entire contract are annotated 
therein. 
It would seem that in the instant cast, the rule 
set forth in the Colovos case is applicable. In the 
Colovos case, supra, the Court said that the error in 
not instructing the jury that the recovery was limited 
up to the time of the filing of the amended complaint, 
was not reversible error because the Plaintiff in his 
complaint and amended complaint asked for recovery 
only up to the time of filing of the complaint. 
A number of Western States seem to follow the 
rule set forth in the Colovos case, supra: 
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Trompeter vs. United Insurance Company, 
Wash., 1957, 316 P.2nd 455. 
Univ. Life and Accident Insurance Company 
vs. Saunders, Texas, 102 SW 2nd 405. 
Lane vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engine-
men and Firemen, Oregon, 1937, 73 P.2nd 
1396. 
Smith vs. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident 
Association, Oklahoma, 1933, 10 F.S. 110. 
Mid-continent Life Insurance Company vs. 
Walker, 260 P. 1109, California 
Cobb vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 51 
P.2nd 84 
Erreca vs. Wes tern States Life Insurance Co., 
121 P.2nd 689. 
The Trial Court in this case, ruled that there had 
been a repudiation or renunciation of the contract 
provisions and ruled that testimony relative to a lump 
sum payment for future benefits would be admissible 
(R. 50) (T. 3). The Court so ruled, despite the fact 
that in Defendants-Appellants' Answers, (T3a), the 
Defendant-Appellant, United Life Insurance Com-
pany stated: 
"Answering paragraph 3 of said Com-
plaint, Defendant admits the issuance of the 
insurance policy referred to in said Complaint, 
and alleges affirmatively that the only pay-
ments for which the Defendant did become o~ 
ligated would be in accordance with the terms 
and provisions of the policy." 
In the Answer of the Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
Company, that Defendant-Appellant stated: 
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"Answering paragraph 3 of said Com-
plaint, Defendant admits that the policy num-
bered 76DLSE 385336-64M issued and alleges 
affirmatively that Defendant agreed to pay 
the benefits in accordance with the provisions 
of the policy." 
During the trial, both Defendants-Appellants admit-
ed that they were bound under the policy and that 
both Defendants-Appellants agreed to pay benefits 
in accordance with the provisions of the policy, and 
the Defendants-Appellants still admit responsibility 
under the policies. 
In New York Life Insurance Company vs. Viglas, 
297 U.S. 672, 56 S. Ct. 615, 80 L. Ed. 971, it was 
held that refusal in good faith of an insurer which 
had contracted to pay benefits and waive premiums 
on a life insurance policy during the total disability 
of the insured, to pay further benefits on the ground 
that the insured had ceased to be totally disabled, such 
refusal to continue the policy in force, unless the pre-
miums were paid, did not constitute a repudiation of 
the policy, or constitute such a breach of its provi-
sions as to make additional and future benefits a 
measure of recovery and permit the recovery of dam-
ages in excess of benefits in default at the time of 
the action. In order for the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach to apply, there must be a repudiation or re-
nuciation, or prevention of performance. 
See 17 Am. Jur. 2nd, Secs. 449, 450, 451, under 
Contracts 
See Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 318 
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There has been no breach of contract policy by 
the Defendants-Appellants. 
In 44 Am. Jur. 2nd, Section 1598, page 486, it 
states: 
"A substantial number of authorities have 
adopted the view that in case of the breach of 
contract by an insurer, to pay periodic indem-
nity of benefits, the right of action is limited 
to the installments which have accrued to the 
date of the action, or if the complaint is amend-
ed to include the installments accruing during 
the pendency of the action, to those which have 
accrued prior to the judgment and that the 
judgment cannot be rendered in favor of the 
insured for the installments not accrued at 
such time." 
Among the cases cited in the footnote are: 
Erreca vs. Western State Life, 212 P.2nd 689, 
141ALR18 
Fanning vs. GuardUin Life Insurance Co., 59 
Wash. 2nd 101, 366 P.2nd 207 
In the same section of 44 Am. J ur. 2nd, at page 
487, it states: 
"It has been held, however, that an insur-
er's refusal to continue total disability benefits 
upon the ground that the insured was not in 
fact totally disabled, does not amount to such 
a repudiation and breach as to make condition-
al and future benefits the measure of recovery. 
It has also been held that an insurer's refusal 
to ,;>ay a claim for disability benefits under a 
pohcy providing for monthly benefit payments 
for total and permanent disability, but provid-
ing for termination of benefit payments if the 
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insured ceased to be disabled during that peri-
od, on the ground that medical investigation 
showed that the insured was not disabled with-
in the meaning of the policy, does not consti-
tute a repudiation of the policy so as to entitle 
the insured, upon establishing disability with-
in the meaning of the policy, to recover judg-
ment for unmatured instalments upon the 
ground of anticipatory breach of the contract." 
As to the use of the life expectancy of the in-
sured, the same text states: 
"On the other hand, if an action to recover 
future instalments may not be maintained, 
the expectancy of life of the insured does not 
enter into the question of the insurer's liability 
for the instalments which have accrued, and 
if there has been no anticipatory breach by the 
insurer, the courts do not favor adopting as 
the measure of damages the expectancy of life 
of the insured." 
POINT NO. IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN TAKING 
A WAY FROM THE JURY THE DETER-
MINATION OF THE LIFE EXPECT-
ANCY OF THE PLAINTIFF-RESPOND-
ENT. 
Assuming, without admitting that the trial court 
did not err in graning an award for future disability, 
based upon the entire contract and the life expectancy 
discounted to the present values, the finding of fact 
as to how long Mr. Greguhn would have lived, is a 
finding of fact for the jury to make. In jury trials, 
the jury is sole trier of the fact. They were entitled 
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to determine whether the insured, with all of his 
health problems would have lived the same years, less 
or more than the mortality tables for a man of Mr. 
Greguhn's sex and age. 
In this case, the trial court merely made a matha-
matical computation based upon the life expectancy 
of a person of Mr. Greguhn's age and sex. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants-Appellants respectfuuly urge 
this Court to reverse the Order of the trial court to 
the effect that there was sufficient evidence to sub-
mit this case to the jury; and that this court direct 
that judgment be entered for the Defendants-Appel-
lants. 
In the event that this Court holds that the trial 
court did not err in submitting the case to the jury, 
that a new trial be granted because of error in law 
in the instructions given by the trial court, and be-
cause of the failure of the trial court to submit to the 
ju1-y for a finding on the issue of fact of the Plaintiff-
Respondent's life expectancy. 
Should this court find that there was sufficient 
evidence to submit the case to the jury and that there 
was no error in law, the Defendants-Appellants urge 
this court to reverse the trial court as to that portion 
of the judgment entered for future damages and re-
quire that the Plaintiff-Respondent receive monthly 
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benefits upon submitting the proper proofs of medical 
disability as called for by the policies. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES E. FAUST 
Attorney for Deferul.ants-
Appellants. 
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